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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O,F UTAH
SALrr LAI(E COUNTY, et al.,
Respondents,
-vs.LIQUOR COMMISSION, et al.,
Appellants.

Case
No. 9207

BRIEF O·F APIPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action, filed December 22, 1959, in the
Third District Court, brought by Salt Lake County
against the Liquor Control Com1nission, the individual
commissioners, and individuals Drake and Anderson for
injunctive relief to prevent the Liquor ·Commission from
using real property situated in Salt Lake County for
liquor stores. There are two parcels of land in issue and
the complaint alleges that individuals Drake are the owners of one and individuals Anderson are the owners of
the other.
The basis for the granting of such relief according to
plaintiff's complaint "\Yas that such stores did not comply
"ith the require1nents of the county zoning ordinance,
1
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as enacted and amended, and further that defendants had
not complied with the provisions of Title 17-27-8, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended. Chapter 27 of Title
17 provides for a county planning commission and for the
establishment of master plans and zoning ordinances to
be enacted by counties. The chapter furter provides a
method of application for permission to construct or use
buildings or structures in accordance with such master
plans and zoning requirements.
The District Court, over the signature of Stewart M.
Hanson, issued an Order to Show Cause, supported by
affidavit, requiring the defendants to show cause why an
injunction should not issue. A temporary restraining
order was not permitted by the court.
On January 13, 1960 the defendants, Liquor Commission, the individual commissioners and defendants
Drake made a motion to dismiss and hearing on the Order
to Show Cause was continued without date until the
motion to dismiss had been argued. The motion was
argued January 25th before the Honorable Ray Van Cott,
Jr., and was denied.
On February 7, 1960 the Liquor Co1nmission and the
individual commissioners petitioned this court to be
granted an interlocutory appeal. On February 9th plaintiff filed answer to this petition, and on February 16th
the court granted an appeal.
On April 26, 1960, upon stipulation of eounsel, this
action was dismissed as to the individual commissioners,
Paul V. ICelly, Allan D. Johnson and J. W. Pace. Since

2
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individual defendants, Drake and Anderson,- did not
choose to appeal or respond, the parties remaining before
this court are the defendant-appellant, Utah Liquor Control Commission, and plaintiff-respondent, Salt Lake
County.
STATEME:t'~T

OF POINTS

POINiT I
THE UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION IS NOT
SUBJECT TO ZONING REGULATIONS OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY.
POINT II
'THE LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION IS SUBJE·GT TO
SUIT ONLY UPON CO·MPLIANCE WITH THE PROCEDURE
OUTLINED IN TITLE 32-1-28, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953, REQUIRING THE WRI'TTEN CONSENT OF THE GOVERNOR BEFORE PRO·CEEDINGS MAY BE INSTITUTED.
POINT III
THE LIQUOR CONTROL ·COMMISSION, APART FROM
THE EXCEPTION NOTED IN POINT II, IS IMl\iUNE FROM
LAWSUIT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.
POINT IV
THE STATU'TE UPON WHICH SALT LAKE COUNTY
RELIES PROVIDES BY ITS OWN TERMS THAT DISAPPROVAL BY THE CO·UNTY PLANNING COMMISSION
MAY BE OVERRULED BY A MAJORITY vo·TE OF THE
PUBLIC AGENCY AUTHORIZING OR FINAN·CING SUCH
BUILDING, IF SUCH PUBLIC AGENCY IS WITHOUT THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; AND
SU·CH OVERRULING SHOULD BE IMPLIED FROM THE
LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION'S CONDUCT IN OPENING
AND OPERATING THE STORES IN QUESTION.

3
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POINT V
THE BUILDINGS IN QUESTIO·N ARE NOT "PUBLIC
BUILDINGS'' AS DEFINED IN TI'TLE 17-27-8, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, UPON WHICH SALT
LAKE COUNTY RELIES.
POINT VI
THE LIQUOR ·CONTROL COMMISSION IS NOT WITHIN
THE DEFINITION OF "ANY PERSON, FIRM OR CORPO-RATION" USED IN TITLE 17-27-23, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, UPON WHICH SALT LAKE COUNTY RELIES.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION IS NOT
SUBJE,CT TO ZONING REGULATIONS OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY.

The question of regulation of state agencies by municipalities was first ruled upon by this court in the case
of Salt Lake City v. Board of Education of Salt Lake
City, 52 U. 540, 175 P. 65-±. In that case Salt Lake City
attempted to require the Board of Education of Salt Lake
City to comply with a municipal fire ordinance in connection with an addition to an elementary school being constructed by the school board. This court cited with approval the case of Kentucky I nst. for E ducat~on of Blind
v. City of Louisville, 123 l(y. 767, 97 S.W. 402, 8 L.R.A.
(NS) 533, in the following language:
"The principle is that the state, 'vhen creating
municipal governments, does not cede to them any
control of the state's property situated "\vithin
them, nor over any property "\Yhich the state has
authorized another body or power to control."
4
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rrhe court ,vent on to hold that the ·Constitution and the
statutes of the state gave control of schools and school
affairs to the respective boards of education and having
so done, pre-e1npted fro1n municipalities the exercise of
control over school buildings.

of North Summit School District, 81 U. 51, 16 P.2d 900.
and approved in the case of Beard v. Board of Educat,ion
~ Salt Lake City case has been cited subsequently

f.

In Title 32-1-6, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, the Legislature granted to the Liquor Control Commission the power
to:
" (a) Have the general control, management
and supervision of all liquor stores and package
agencies.
"(b) Decide, within the limits and under the
conditions imposed by this act, the number and
location of the stores and package agencies to be
established in the state." (Emphasis added.)
Title 32-1-12, U.C.A. 1953, further provides:

"* * * all property acquired, administered,
possessed or received by the commission, shall be
the property of the state, * * *."
The property in question is owned or possessed by
the State of Utah and the Legislature has expressly vested
the exclusive control of said property in the Liquor Control Commission. Accordingly, under the holding of the
Salt Lake City case, neither the property nor the commission is subject to regulation on the part of Salt Lake
County.
This holding 1s 1n accord "\Yith the overwhelming
5
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weight of case law on the subject. See 61 A.L.R. 2d 970
and 171 A.L.R. 325 ; also see 31 A.L.R. 450. The cases
cited in these annotations illustrate the generally accepted rule that governmental agencies are not subject
to municipal zoning regulations when such agencies are
performing "governmental" rather than "proprietary"
functions.
In the case of Utah Mfrs.' Ass'n. v. Stewart, 82 U.
198, 23 P.2d 229, this court held that the Liquor Control
Agency was clearly a governmental rather than a proprietary agency and that control of liquor traffic was a
proper exercise of the police power of the state and not
a monopolistic invasion into private enterprise. The
opinion reads in part :
"That the prohibition or regulation of the
manufacture, transportation, sale, and use of alcohol and other intoxicating liquors is an exercise
of the police power of the state admits of no
doubt."
Further:
"It is alleged a monopoly is created because
no one except the manager designated by the
Governor may sell alcohol within the state, and
plaintiff and others similarly situated must purchase from him and no one else the alcohol required for manufacturing purposes. Ordinarily
monopolies are regarded as obnoxious, and a state
Legislature may not, under the guise of police
power, create a monopoly in any trade or occupation or article innocuous in itself and the prosecution of or dealing in which is "\vithin the common
right of all citizens on equal ter1ns. 19 R.C.L. 14.
There is, however, no c.ommon right on the part
6
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of any person to sell intoxicating liquor, especially
where the state has undertaken to control or prohibit the traffic as has been done in this state.
Trageser v. Gray, 73 Md. 250, 20 A. 905, 9 L.R.A.
780, 25 Am. St. Rep. 587. The right to sell intoxicating liquor is not one of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States which
the states are forbidden to abridge. McClure v.
Topf & Wright, 112 Ark. 342, 166 S.W. 174. The
rule is stated as follo,vs in 19 R.C.L. 14 (Monopolies and ·Combinations): 'However partial it
may seem, the state can create a 1nonopoly of any
business that is inherently dangerous to society
and for that reason may lawfully be prohibited by
it on the grounds of public policy, without violating any constitutional inhibition, because no person possesses an inherent right to engage in any
employment, the pursuit of which is necessarily
detrimental to the public.'
"And in 6 R.C.L. p. 408 (Constitutional Law),
as follows: 'For the purposes of government exclusive rights and privileges are occasionally
granted to particular individuals. When the public purpose of such grants is apparent the courts
as a rule sustain them as in no wise denying to any
the equal protection of the laws or violating p-rohibitions as to the granting to any one of special
and exclusive rights or immunities. This principle
has been applied to sustain the validity of exclusive privileges to remove garbage from cities, to
dispense intoxicating liquors, to supply school
books, to operate ferries and to exercise the power
of eminent domain.' '' (Emphasis added)
While it is to be observed that this Ste,vart ease was deeided during the days of prohibition and related to the
control agency which preceded the present Liquor Control Con1mission, the control of that agency over alcohol
7
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and intoxicating liquors was, if anything, rnore stringent
and far-reaching than the control of the present commission. Accordingly, since the predecessor agency was held
to be properly acting in a governmental capacity, and its
functions were a proper exercise of the police power, the
present commission's activities must be viewed as coming
well within the rule laid down in the Stewart case. This
interpretation is reinforced by the language of Title
32-1-2, U.C.A. 1953, illustrating the Legislature's intent in
creating the present commission:
"This act shall be deemed an exercise of the
police powers of the state for the protection of
the public health, peace and morals; to prevent
the recurrence of abuses associated with saloons;
to eliminate the evils of unlicensed and unlawful
manufacture, selling and disposing of alcoholic
beverages ; and all provisions of this act shall be
liberally construed for the attainment of these
purposes."
Since the Legislature has given exclusive control
over intoxicating liquors and the dispensing of the same
to the Liquor Control Comn1ission, and since this court
has held that such control is a legitimate exercise of the
state's police power, to require the commission now to
comply with county zoning ordinances would seriously
encroach upon that exclusive control. Counties, by the
simple expedient of zoning regulation, could prevent the
commission from placing any dispensing agencies 'vithin
their borders or, if not totally prohibiting, relegate the
possible location of such stores to such inac.cessible locations as to make their construction impracticable. Certainly such a ruling \Yould be a direct negation of the
8
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Legislature's edict above cited ordering a broad construction of the liquor control act to effectuate its purposes.
POINT II
'THE LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION IS SUBJE·CT TO
SUIT ONLY UPON CO·MPLIANCE WITH THE PRO·CEDURE
OUTLINED IN TITLE 32-1-28, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953 REQUIRING THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE GOVERN'OR BEFORE PRO·CEEDINGS MAY BE INSTITUTED.

The language of Title 32-1-28, U.C.A. 1953, provides
as follows:
"The commission may with the wr~tten consent of the governor be sued and may institute or
defend proceedings in any court of law or otherwise in the name of 'Liquor Control Commission
of Utah' as fully and effectually to all intents
and purposes and no such proceedings shall be
taken against or in the names of the members of
the commission, and no such pToceedings shall
abate by reason of any change in the membership
of the commission by death, resignation or otherwise, but such proceedings may be continued as
though such changes had not been made."
(Emphasis added.)
No permission from the governor in advance of suit has
been alleged by plaintiff in this action.
The above cited provision has been referred to by
this court in the case of Riggins v. Distr~ct Court of Salt
Lake County, 89 U. 183, 51 P. 2d 645, at page 661. Before the court in that case was the objection that the
Liquor Control Commission could not sue without first
obtaining the governor's permission. The commission in
its O\vn name had proceeded in a civil nuisance action
9
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and the issue was raised by way of defense. The court
answered the question in the following language:
"The point is made that under the provisions
of section 30 the commission may not sue without
the written consent of the Governor. That section
is not open to that construction. The import of
the language used in that section is that the commission may be sued with the written consent of
the Governor, but that it may on its own account
and in its own name institute a suit the same as if
it were incorporated."
The above language would indicate that only when the
commission is sued is the governor's consent necessarybut it is necessary.
In the case of State v. Lack, 118 U. 128, 221 P.2d
852, which was a criminal prosecution for embezzlement
against an agent of the Liquor Commission, the defendant claimed the criminal proceeding was invavlid since
the provisions of this section in question had not been
met. The court there said :
"The contention of appellant is without
merit. The quoted provision of the statute in
question is a part of a chapter of the act which
relates to its administration and to the po,vers
and functions of the Liquor Control Commission.
It grants a ltmited and conditional waiver of the
immunity of the state and i~ts officials to civil
suit." (Emphasis added.)
It would appear, therefore, that this court has recognized that the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies expressly to the Utah Liquor ·Control Co1runission, exempting it fron1 suit e~xcept where this ilnmunity is 'vaived by

10
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compliance with this procedural requirement of gaining
the governor's consent. Appellant maintains that this
element of consent is an essential part of plaintiff's
pleading and in its absence, plaintiff has no standing
in court.
POINT III
THE LIQUOR CONTROL ·COMMISSION, APART FROM
THE EXCEPTION NOTED IN POINT II, IS IMMUNE FROM
LAWSUIT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.

The question of immunity of state liquor agencies
from lawsuit has been ruled upon in the federal courts
and in seven state jurisdictions. Perhaps a typical holding is that of State ex rel. Wilk~nson v. Murphy, 237 Ala.
332, 186 So. 487, 121 A.L.R. 283, where the court used
the following language:
"It has been said in reference to legislation
concerning intoxicating liquors, that the power of
the state in this regard is an incident to society's
right of self-protection. 'It is therefore essentially
subject to the police power and has been so regarded for over a century.' 15 R.c·.L. 254. Its
regulation and control is held by all the authorities to be a governmental function based upon the
duty of the government to protect the community
from crime and the burdens of pauperism. So regarded, when the state itself takes over the traffic,
it is as much in the exercise of a governmental
function, through the police power, as when it
works its convicts on farms purchased and in
factories constructed by the state.
"As 've read the argument, it is conceded that
as to regulation, control or prohibition of the
11
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liquor traffic, the state is in the exercise of its
police power and of its governmental functions,
but that when the state establishes its own liquor
stores, there is a sudden shift from the police
power, and the government is then engaged in a
private enterprise. And this is urged, notwithstanding the universally recognized principle that
it is the peculiar function of the lawmakers to
ascertain and to determine the appropriate measures to be used in the exercise of this undoubted
police power. No one has any inherent right to
engage in the liquor traffic, and this argument
leads to the illogical result that the state may
license and delegate to another that which it cannot do itself. Sound reasoning, we submit, justifies no such conclusion.
"Police power is inherent in the government,
and while it may be set aside by the Constitution,
yet in order to find that it has been so set aside
the Constitution must plainly so indicate. Relator
therefor must rest upon section 93 of our Constitution to find such a result. And yet this section
gives not the slightest indication of any such intention.
"It follows, therefore, that this police power
over the liquor traffic is wholly uninfluenced and
unaffected by any constitutional provision. The
state as a consequence still posseses the power
to its fullest extent and the authorities cited disclose that laws of this character have been uniforn1ly upheld. Indeed, "\Ye find none to the contrary."
The questjon is further annotated at 9 A.L.R. 2d 1284
and 121 A.L.R. 300.
The V\reight of authority of all the cases co1npiled in
these annotations clearly indicates that state liquor

12
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agencies are proper adjuncts of state government and
as such, are irn1nune from suit except in those states
where the immunity has been expressly eliminated by
constitutional or statutory provision. Such statutory or
constitutional elimination has not occurred in the State
of Utah with the exception 'of the statutory provision
referred to in Point II of this brief concerning the
governor's consent.
The status of the rule of sovereign immunity in Utah
is commented upon at length in the dissenting opinion
and Note 9 in the recent case of Springvvlle Banking
Co. v. Burt-on. ________ Utah ________ , 349 P.2d 157, decided
Feb. 1, 1960. Note 9 states, at page 168:

"* * * And why has the Utah legislature enacted legislation pern1itting certain state agencies
to be sued, such as the Road and Liquor c·ommissions, unless it has been assumed that the
state enjoys sovereign immunity from suit in
spite of Art. I, Sec. 22 ~"
As noted in Note 9, the overwhelming weight of authority supports the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as does
the holding of the majority opinion.
With the reservation noted in Point II, appellant
maintains that the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies in this fact situation and that the Liquor Control
Commission, in operating the two stores in question,
is ilnmune fro1n suit by Salt Lake County.
POINT IV
THE STATU'TE UPON WHICH SALT LAKE COUNTY
RELIES PROVIDES BY ITS OWN TERMS THAT DIS-

13
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APPROVAL BY THE COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION
MAY BE OVERRULED BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF THE
PUBLIC AGENCY AUTHORIZING OR FINAN·CING SUCH
BUILDING, IF SUCH PUBLIC AGENCY IS WITHOUT THE
JURISDICTION OF THE CO·UNTY COMMISSIONERS; AND
SU·CH OVERRULING SHOULD BE IMPLIED FROM THE
LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION'S CO·NDUCT IN OPENING
AND OPERATING THE STORES IN QUESTION.

Title 17-27-8,
follows:

u~c.A.

1953, as amended, reads as

"Whenever any board of county commissioners shall have adopted an official map of
the county or any part thereof, then and thenceforth no pubic road, park or other public way,
ground, or space, no public building or structure
or no public utility, whether publicly or privately
owned, which is not shown or described on the
official map as part of the approved development within the county, shall be constructed
or authorized in the unincorporated territory of
the county until and unless the proposed location
and extent thereof shall have been submitted to
and ap·proved by such county planning commission; provided, however, that in case of disapproval, the said planning commission shall
communicate its reasons to the board of county
commissioners of the county in which the public
way, ground, space, building, structure, or utility
is proposed to be located; and such board shall
have the power to overrule such disapproval
by a vote of not less than a majority of its
entire membership, and upon such overruling
said or other official in charge of proposed construetion or authorization may proceed therewith;
provided fu.rther, hozrever, that if the public
way, ground, space, bu.ilding, structure, or utility
be one, the authorizati-on or financ1mg of which

14
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does not, under the law governing the same, faU
w~thin the province of the board of county commissioners or other county official or board, then
the S1,tbm~ssvon to the county planning commission shall be made by the body or official having
s nch jurisdiction, and the said planning comn~ission's disapproval may be overruled by said
body by a vote of not less than ,a majoriJty of
its entire membership or by said off~cial. The
acceptance, widening, removal, extension, relocation, narro,ving, vacation, abandonment, change
of use, acquisiton of land for, or sale or lease
of any road, park, or other public way, ground,
place, property, or structure shall be subject to
similar submission and approval, and the failure
to approve rnay be similarly overruled. The failure of the commission to act within thirty days
from and after the date of official submission
to it shall be deemed approval, unless a longer
period be granted by the submitting board, body,
or official." (Emphasis added)
While this statutory provision has never been construed by this court, appellant maintains that its language is clear and indicates that in this fact situation,
since the Utah Liquor Control Commission is the agency
financing the purchase of the 33rd South building and
authorizing the lease of and in fact leasing the Kearns
store, and since further the law governing the operation
of these stores does not "fall within the province of
the board of county commissioners or other county
official or board," the Liquor Control Commission IS
free to overrule the County Planning Commission.
\Vbile the Liquor Control Commission has not affirmatively ans,vered plaintiff's complaint and has not
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affirmatively alleged such overruling vote of the majority of its members, appellant maintains such ministerial act can clearly be m~~~~ commission's
conduct in operating these stores.
So, assuming the statute upon which the plaintiff
relies applies to appellant, which, as noted above, appellant does not concede, there has, in any event, been
an implied compliance by appellant with the terms of
that statute.
POINT V
THE BUILDINGS IN QUESTIO·N ARE NOT "PUBLIC
BUILDINGS'' AS DEFINED IN TTTLE 17-27-8, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, UPON WHICH SALT
LAKE COUN·TY RELIES.

In Salt Lake City v. Board of Educat~on of Salt
Lake City, 52 U. 540, 175 P. 654, this court ruled that
state-owned buildings were not public buildings, under
the terms of the ordinance relied upon by Salt Lake
City, in the following language:

"* * * If it be conceded, therefore, as it is
and must be, that the state has not surrendered
the control over its buildings to the cities, then
it necessarily follo'\\'"S that the tern1s 'public
buildings' and 'all buildings' used in the subdivisions of section 206, supra (city ordinance),
'\Vhich we have quoted, do not embrace all buildings '\Yithin the cities. ~foreover, if state buildings
must be excluded, then public school buildings
Inust like,vise be excluded from those terms."
\Vhile it is true that the tern1s 'public buildings"
eonstrued b~v the court appeared in a Salt Lake City
4
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ordinance rather than in this statute relied upon by
Salt Lake County, the ordinance and the statute have
the common feature of being zoning regulations, and
appellant maintains that the same construction should
be given both.
POINT VI
THE LIQUOR ·CONTROL COMMISSIO'N IS NOT WITHIN
THE DEFINITION OF "ANY PERSON, FIRM OR CORPORATION" USED IN TITLE 17-27-23, UTAH CODE ANN'OTATED 1953, UPON WHI~CH SALT LAKE CO·UNTY RELIES.

The language of Title 17-27-23, U.C.A. 1953, which
is the penal section of the zoning statute on which Salt
Lake County relies provides in part:
'~*

* * Any person, firm or corporation violating any regulation in, or of any provision of,
any zoning resolution, or any amendment of this
act, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. * * *" (Emphasis added)
In federal as well as state court, agencies of state
or federal governments have been held to be without
the definition of "person" or "corporation." A partial
list of the cases so holding follows: U. S. v. UniJted
1llines Workers of Amerioa, 67 S. Ct. 677, 330 U. S. 258,
91 L.Ed. 884; Hoyt v. Bd. of Civil Service Comm. of
City of Los Angeles, (Calif.), 132 P.2d 804; Cvty of St.
Petersburg v. Carter, (Fla.), 39 So.2d 804; Att'y. General v. City of Woburn, (Mass.), 79 N.E.2d 187; Poynter
v. Ottertail County, (Minn.), 25 N.W.2d 708; U. S. v.
Board of Finance & Revenue, (Pa.), 85 A.2d 156; State
r. Central Power & Light Co., (Tex.), 161 S.W.2d 766.
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It is also to be noted that the above-quoted section
specifies that any violation thereof is a misdemeanor,
making the statute a criminal one. To subject the Liquor
Control Commission, therefore, to the provisions of
this statute would lead to the absurd result of holding
a state agency guilty of committing a crime against
the state.
CONC.LUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, appellant maintains that the trial court erred in denying appellant's
motion to dismiss. Appellant respectfully requests that
this court reverse the District ·Court with instructions
that this action be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,

WALTER L. BUDGE
.Attorney General
GORDON A. MADSEN
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Appellant
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